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In this Comment, the author examines the consequences of using 
identical rules to govern the affirmative action policies of both private 
employers and private schools.  The author explores accepted legal 
justifications for private affirmative action, focusing on whether these 
justifications are internal or external to the defendant.  The author 
contends that the Supreme Court’s dicta in Johnson v. Transportation 
Agency weigh in favor of using external imbalances to justify private 
affirmative action when viewed in light of developments in Equal 
Protection Clause jurisprudence.  The author demonstrates that departing 
from the affirmative-action rule for private employers – by allowing 
private schools to use external racial imbalances as justifications for their 
affirmative action policies – results in the most effective allocation of 
incentives and means for private schools to remedy racial disparities.  In 
contrast to private employers and private colleges, the author proposes that 
K-12 private schools be able to use external imbalances to justify their 
affirmative action policies because such affirmative action benefits society 
more than currently permitted forms of affirmative action.     
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3INTRODUCTION 
Is it legal for a private school to have the mission of improving a racial group’s 
educational status when that group academically underachieves?  If so, is it legal for the school 
to exclusively or primarily admit students of that racial group to better achieve its mission?  In 
reality, the answer to the second question determines the answer to the first question because a 
school that cannot exclusively or primarily admit students of a particular racial group would be 
severely limited in its efforts to improve that group’s educational achievement. 
 Although the case is now being decided en banc by the Ninth Circuit,1 the opinion of a 
three-judge panel in Doe v. Kamehameha Schools2 is significant in setting forth an approach to 
answering the above questions.  The panel essentially held that a private school, the 
Kamehameha Schools, can never use a racial preference, a Native Hawaiian3 preference, to 
exclusively admit students of a particular racial group, even if that group significantly 
underperforms in school.   
 The Kamehameha Schools have operated since 1887 as the charitable legacy of Princess 
Bernice Pauahi Bishop, the last direct descendant of King Kamehameha I.4 Private and 
 
1 Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 4167 at *1. 
 2 Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 416 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 3 Although there is general controversy as to whether Native Hawaiians should be treated 
as a race by law, the Kamehameha Schools conceded that their Native Hawaiian preference was 
a racial preference.  Kamehameha, 416 F.3d at 1047.  Congress has found that Native Hawaiians 
academically underperform.  See, e.g., Native Hawaiian Education Act of 2002, 20 U.S.C. §§ 
7511-7517 (2005). 
 4 Id. at 1027.   
4nonsectarian,5 the Kamehameha Schools’ mission is “to fulfill Pauahi’s desire to create 
educational opportunities in perpetuity to improve the capability and well-being of people of 
Hawaiian ancestry.”6 To further its mission, the Kamehameha Schools have an 118-year-old 
policy of offering admissions preference to applicants of Hawaiian ancestry.7 For its K-12 
schools, the Kamehameha Schools’ admissions policy is implemented in a two-part process: the 
applicant first demonstrates his academic qualifications and then completes the Ethnic Ancestry 
Survey.8
John Doe had sought to be admitted but was denied admission to the Kamehameha 
Schools twice.  Each time he had met the academic standards and acknowledged that he 
possessed no aboriginal blood.9 Doe consequently filed suit against the Kamehameha Schools.10 
He alleged that the Schools’ admissions policy violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981,11 the relevant part of 
 
5 This Comment addresses the legality of affirmative action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in 
private nonsectarian schools but not private sectarian schools, to which different rules apply.  
See, e.g., EEOC v. Kamehameha Schs., 848 F. Supp. 899 (D. Haw. 1993). 
 6 KAMEHAMEHA SCHOOLS STRATEGIC PLAN 2000-2015, at 19, available at 
http://www.ksbe.edu/osp/StratPlan/EntireDocument.pdf.  
 7 Thomas Yoshida, Appeals Court to Rehear Admissions Policy Challenge,
http://www.ksbe.edu/article.php?story=20060222115646371. 
 8 Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 416 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
11 Id. 
5which protects a person’s “right to make and enforce contracts” from racial discrimination.12 
The district court, however, granted summary judgment in favor of the Schools and other 
defendants because “the admissions policy constituted a valid race-conscious remedial 
affirmative action program.”13 Doe appealed.14 
Because the Kamehameha Schools “employ[ed] an express racial classification,” the 
Ninth Circuit panel determined that its admissions policy constituted a prima facie case of 
intentional race discrimination.15 In response,16 the Kamehameha Schools argued “that its policy 
constitute[d] a valid affirmative action plan rationally related to redressing present imbalances in 
the socioeconomic and educational achievement of native Hawaiians, producing native Hawaiian 
 
12 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006) provides: 
 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have 
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be 
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and 
exactions of every kind, and to no other. 
 
13 Kamehameha, 416 F.3d at 1029. 
 
14 Kamehameha, 416 F.3d at1027. 
 
15 Kamehameha, 416 F.3d at 1039.  In Runyon v. McCray, 427 U.S. 160 (1876), the 
Supreme Court determined that the right of admission to a private school falls under § 1981’s 
“right to make and enforce contracts.”  
 16 The prima facie case of intentional race discrimination created a presumption that the 
Kamehameha Schools had engaged in intentional discrimination.  Kamehameha, 416 F.3d at 
1039.   
6leadership for community involvement, and revitalizing native Hawaiian culture.”17 However, 
the panel reasoned that an affirmative action policy can justify a racial preference only when it 
satisfies three requirements advanced by the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of America 
v. Weber.18 Under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Weber, affirmative action policies in the 
employment context must: 1) “respond to a manifest imbalance in its work force,” 2) not create 
an absolute bar to the advancement of the non-preferred race or unnecessarily trammel the rights 
of the non-preferred race, and 3) do no more than is necessary to achieve a balance.19 
Seeing “no basis for a different rule regarding a plan’s alleged violation of § 1981 in the 
context of private education,” the panel determined that the Kamehameha Schools’ racial 
preference was designed to deny admission to all students possessing no aboriginal blood so long 
as a sufficient number of qualified Native Hawaiians sought admission.20 It reasoned that the 
Schools’ policy effectively created an absolute bar to the attendance of those not descended from 
the Hawaiian race21 and consequently failed the second prong of the Ninth Circuit’s Weber 
rule.22 
17 Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 416 F.3d 1025, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 18 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
 19 Kamehameha, 416 F.3d at 1040-41. 
 20 Id. (“We see no basis for a different  rule regarding a plan’s alleged violation of § 1981 in 
the context of private education.”); cf. id. (“We are persuaded that these general principles [for 
testing the validity of an affirmative action plan] may be rationally applied in the context of 
private education, with certain modifications to account for the differences of context.”). 
 21 Although a student not of Native Hawaiian ancestry was admitted in 2003, the Ninth 
Circuit determined that his admission was by accident rather than by design.  Id. at 1040 n.8. 
7Although the panel did not make this clear, it effectively provided that a private school’s 
affirmative action policy must: 1) respond to a manifest imbalance in its student population, 2) 
not create an absolute bar to the admission of the non-preferred race or unnecessarily trammel 
the rights of the non-preferred race, and 3) do no more than is necessary to achieve a balance in 
its student population.  Caselaw in the private employment context has established that a 
manifest imbalance can be shown if there is a much smaller percentage of the preferred racial 
group in the private employer’s population than the surrounding population.23 Extending the 
panel’s logic of identically treating affirmative action policies in private employers and private 
schools, a manifest imbalance for the purpose of justifying private-school affirmative action 
should be established if there is a much smaller percentage of the preferred racial group in the 
private school population than the surrounding population. 
 The Ninth Circuit panel did not address whether the Kamehameha Schools’ admission 
policy would have been valid if it had created a significant rather than an absolute bar to the 
attendance of people who are not partly Native Hawaiian.24 However, the consequence of the 
 
22 See Kamehameha, 416 F.3d at 1041. 
 23 See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 646, 631-32 (1987) (reasoning that a manifest 
imbalance can be determined through “a comparison of the percentage of minorities or women in 
the employer’s work force with the percentage in the area labor market or general population . . . 
in analyzing jobs that require no special expertise”). 
 24 Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 416 F.3d 1025, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Even if we 
assumed that some, limited racial preferences might be appropriate in order for the Schools to 
advance its mission, an absolute bar on the basis of race alone exceeds any reasonable 
application of Weber, Rudebush, and the cases that followed in their wake.”). 
8panel’s decision to import the Weber rule from the private employment context to the private 
education context, without change, is that the Kamehameha Schools almost certainly cannot use 
any Native Hawaiian admissions preference.   
 Under the rule imported from Weber, the Kamehameha Schools would almost certainly 
not be able to use a Native Hawaiian admissions preference because there is no manifest internal 
imbalance to justify it: the percentage of Native Hawaiians in the Kamehameha Schools’ 
population is virtually 100 percent,25 whereas the percentage of Native Hawaiians in Hawaii is 
9.4 percent.26 Thus, one specific consequence of applying identical rules to determine the 
legality of affirmative action in both private employers and private schools is to handicap the 
Kamehameha Schools’ ability “to fulfill Pauahi’s desire to create educational opportunities in 
perpetuity to improve the capability and well-being of people of Hawaiian ancestry.”   
Of significance is that this result is not logically limited to the Ninth Circuit.  Other 
circuits have not had the opportunity to decide what rule governs the legality of affirmative 
action in private education.  However, almost every circuit’s rule for affirmative action in private 
employers is like the Ninth Circuit’s in that they require an affirmative action policy to be 
justified by an imbalance within the employer’s workforce, in other words, an “internal 
 
25 A student not of Native Hawaiian ancestry was admitted in 2003.  Kamehameha, 416 
F.3d at 1040 n.8. 
 26 See U.S. Census Bureau: State & County Quickfacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/ 
states/15000.html. 
9imbalance.”27 Some circuits, however, have indicated a willingness to justify affirmative action 
policies with imbalances external to the employer.28 
This Comment sets aside the question of whether a private school should be able to use a 
racial preference to exclusively admit students of an academically underachieving racial group.29 
Instead, this Comment contends that K-12 private schools, including the Kamehameha Schools, 
should be able to primarily admit students of an academically underachieving racial group 
through its affirmative action policy.  Such affirmative action most effectively allocates 
 
27 See infra Part I.B.  More precisely, this Comment defines internal-imbalance 
justifications as those that logically cease justifying an affirmative action policy once the 
percentage of the preferred race in the private entity approximates that in the local area.  Under 
this definition, past discrimination towards blacks or a manifest lack of Asian Americans would 
be internal-imbalance justifications because the private entity has arguably made up for the past 
discrimination towards blacks or the manifest lack of Asian Americans once the percentage of 
the preferred race in the entity’s population approximates that in the local area.  On the other 
hand, the justifications of diversity and improving services to black constituencies are external-
imbalance justifications because the private entity may continue to reap the benefits of diversity 
and improving services to black constituencies, which result from its affirmative action policy, 
even when the percentage of the preferred race in the private entity’s population approximates 
that in the local area.   
 28 See infra Part I.B. 
29 For a piece that addresses this question, see RECENT CASE: Civil Rights –  Section 1981 
– Ninth Circuit Holds That Private School's Remedial Admissions Policy Violates 1981. –  Doe 
v. Kamehameha Schools, 416 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2005), 119 Harv. L. Rev. 661 (2005). 
10 
incentives and means to remedy racial disparities.  It also confers greater benefits and fewer 
burdens on society than forms of affirmative action that are presently permitted.  Toward these 
ends, external imbalances should legitimately justify the use of admissions preferences for 
academically underachieving racial groups in K-12 private schools.   
 Part I of this Comment provides an overview of law governing affirmative action policies 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, with a focus on currently accepted affirmative action justifications.  In 
Part II, I present my thesis: that both precedent and policy support the use of external imbalances 
to justify admissions preferences for academically underachieving racial groups in K-12 private 
schools. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF LAW GOVERNING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES UNDER § 1981
A.  Supreme Court Cases 
 Two Supreme Court cases, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber30 and Johnson v. 
Transportation Agency,31 are the most significant precedents when considering the legality of an 
affirmative action policy under § 1981.32 Although Weber and Johnson deal with the legality of 
affirmative action policies under Title VII, these two cases are still on point because every 
 
30 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
 31 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
 32 Constitutional claims are often present in § 1981 cases involving government defendants.  
See LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 62.01 (2005), available at LEXIS, 3-62 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 62.01.   
11 
jurisdiction either explicitly33 or implicitly34 treats affirmative action policies identically under 
both Title VII35 and § 1981.   
 
33 For jurisdictions that explicitly treat affirmative action policies identically under Title VII 
and § 1981, see Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 416 F.3d 1025, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005); Schurr v. 
Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 499 (3d Cir. 1999); Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 
962, 966-68 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981); McNamara v. City of Chicago, 
867 F. Supp. 739, 752 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930, 980 (E.D. 
Mich. 1979), aff’d sub nom. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1982).   
 34 For jurisdictions that implicitly treat affirmative action policies identically under both 
Title VII and § 1981, see Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472 (11th Cir. 1999) (for 
discrimination against a black woman); Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 26 F.3d 1277, 
1284 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994) (for discrimination against blacks), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1149 (1995); 
Local 35, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. City of Hartford, 625 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(holding that any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 presupposes a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause or Title VII), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); Chance v. Bd. of Examiners, 534 F.2d 
993, 998 (2d Cir. 1976) (“‘[H]aving passed scrutiny under the substantive requirements of Title 
VII, the employment seniority system . . . is not violative of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.’”), cert. denied 
sub nom, Council of Supervisors & Adm’rs v. Chance, 431 U.S. 965 (1977); Frost v. Chrysler 
Motor Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1290, 1296-97 (W.D. Okl. 1993) (simultaneous analysis of 
affirmative action plan’s validity under Title VII and  § 1981); Dougherty v. Barry, 607 F. Supp. 
1271, 1285-88 (D.C. 1985) (simultaneous analysis of affirmative action plan’s validity under 
Title VII and  § 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 869 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Banerjee v. Bd. 
of Trustees, 495 F. Supp. 1148, 1156 (D. Mass. 1980) (reasoning that “the court may treat 
12 
 In Weber, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation’s plant in Gramercy, Louisiana had 
a skilled craftworker population that was 1.83% black and a local labor force that was 39% 
black.36 The Gramercy plant agreed to select new craft trainees on a seniority basis, with the 
proviso that at least 50% of new craft trainees were to be black until the percentage of its black 
 
plaintiff's § 1981 claim and Title VII claim as coextensive” in the subject case where the 
defendant allegedly discriminated against minority plaintiff because “the same factual predicate 
is alleged to constitute a violation of both, and no suggestion has been made that the 
requirements for establishing a violation of § 1981 are different in any manner from the 
requirements for establishing a violation of Title VII”), aff’d, 648 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1981).  The 
Fourth Circuit would likely evaluate the validity of an affirmative action plan identically under 
both § 1981 and Title VII, see Lewis v. Cent. Piedmont Cmty. Coll., 689 F.2d 1207, 1209 n.3  
(4th Cir. 1982) (holding “that the McDonnell Douglas criteria apply equally to cases arising 
under Title VII or § 1981”), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983). 
 35 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The most relevant 
section for the issue at hand is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), which provides that it “shall be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer – 
“(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
“(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, be-cause of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.” 
 
36 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198 (1979). 
13 
skilled craftworkers commensurated with the percentage of blacks in the local labor force.37 The 
most senior black trainee had less seniority than several white production workers whose bids for 
admission were rejected, including the plaintiff who instituted the action.38 
The Supreme Court did not “define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible 
and impermissible affirmative action plans” but concluded “that the adoption of the Kaiser-
USWA plan . . . falls within the area of discretion left by Title VII to the private sector 
voluntarily to adopt affirmative action plans designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance 
in traditionally segregated job categories.”39 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that 
“the purposes of the [affirmative action] plan mirror those of [Title VII].”40 These purposes were 
“to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy” and “to ‘open employment 
opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them.’”41 The 
court’s second reason for upholding the Kaiser-USWA plan was that “the plan does not 
unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees” because the plan: 1) does not require 
the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black hirees, 2) does not create 
an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees, and 3) is a temporary measure.42 
In Johnson, the Santa Clara County Transportation Agency voluntarily adopted an 
affirmative action plan with the long-term goal of attaining a work force whose composition 
 
37 Id. at 198-99.   
 38 Id. at 199. 
 39 Id. at 208. 
 40 Id. 
 41 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). 
 42 Id. 
14 
reflected the proportion of minorities and women in the area labor force.43 Towards this end, the 
plan permitted the consideration of gender as a factor when promoting qualified applicants 
within a traditionally segregated job classification in which women had been significantly 
underrepresented.44 The plan did not set aside a specific number of positions for minorities or 
women but required that short-range goals be established and annually adjusted to serve as the 
most realistic guide for actual employment decisions.45 A female employee, Diane Joyce, was 
promoted to a Skilled Craft Worker job classification over a male employee, Paul Johnson.  Both 
employees had been rated as well qualified for the job, but Johnson had received a 75 on his 
interview and Joyce had received a 73.46 
In reviewing the employment decision at issue in this case, the Supreme Court first 
examined whether the decision was made pursuant to a plan prompted by concerns similar to 
those of the employer in Weber and then determined whether the effect of the plan on males and 
whites was comparable to the effect of the plan in Weber.47 The Supreme Court upheld the 
validity of the Agency’s plan under Title VII because, first, the “consideration of the sex of 
applicants for Skilled Craft jobs was justified by the existence of a ‘manifest imbalance’ that 
reflected underrepresentation of women in ‘traditionally segregated job categories’” and, second, 
 
43 Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1987). 
 44 Id. at 620-21. 
 45 Id. at 622. 
 46 Id. at 623-24. 
 47 Id. at 631. 
15 
the Agency Plan “did not unnecessarily trammel[] the rights of male employees or create[] an 
absolute bar to their advancement.”48 
B.  Proper Justifications for Private Affirmative Action49 
Using Weber and Johnson, lower courts have not crafted identically-phrased rules for 
determining whether an affirmative action plan is legal under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in the 
employment context.  However, they have essentially focused on examining whether the 
affirmative action plan has proper justifications and limitations.50 
Virtually every circuit requires affirmative action to be justified as a response to a racial 
imbalance within the employer’s workforce, but does not permit affirmative action to be justified 
as a response to a racial imbalance existing outside of the employer’s workforce.51 This is 
 
48 Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 637-38, 642 (1987). 
 49 While many cases and articles have focused on categorizing justifications for affirmative 
action plans as either remedial or non-remedial, the categories of “external” and “internal” are 
more appropriate for this Comment.  
 50 See infra Appendix: Survey of Rules Governing Affirmative Action Plans.
51 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ rules clearly indicate the requirement of an internal 
imbalance, see infra Appendix.  See, e.g., Davis v. City of S.F., 890 F.2d 1438, 1448 (9th Cir. 
1989) (finding a manifest imbalance by “compar[ing] the percentage of minorities or women in 
the employer's work force with the percentage in the area labor market or general population”); 
Maitland v. Univ. of Minn., 155 F.3d 1013, 1016-17 (8th Cir. 1998) (considering whether there 
was a manifest imbalance in the salaries of male and female faculty members at the University to 
validate an “affirmative action salary plan”).  The Second Circuit’s rule sets forth the internal 
imbalance requirement more vaguely than the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ rules but also requires 
16 
usually true even when the face of the circuit’s rule fails to indicate that the imbalance must be 
within the employer’s workforce.52 
an imbalance in that particular defendant’s workforce.  See e.g., Honadle v. Univ. of Va., 56 F. 
Supp. 2d 419, 426 (D. Va. 1999) (“In determining whether a manifest imbalance exists for a job 
requiring specialized skills, a comparison should be made between the percentage of minorities 
or women in the employer's work force with those in the labor market.”).  
 52 The stated rules for the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh, and DC Circuits fail 
to indicate that the racial imbalance must be internal to the employer, see infra Appendix, but 
caselaw in these circuits have set forth this requirement.  See e.g., Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n v. 
City of Dallas, 150 F.3d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that manifest imbalance in the 
employer’s rank of deputy chief satisfied the first prong of Weber); Bennett v. Arrington, 20 F.3d 
1525, 1537 (11th Cir. 1994) (“determining whether a manifest imbalance exists that would 
justify race-conscious decisionmaking by the employer involves a comparison of the percentage 
of minority employees in that job” with either “the percentage of minorities in the general area 
labor market” or “the labor market who possess that special skill or training”); Aiken v. City of 
Memphis, 9 F.3d 461, 473 (9th Cir. 1993) (reasoning that statistics comparing defendant’s labor 
force with county population and defendant’s job categories with defendant’s other job 
categories established a manifest imbalance for Title VII); Hammon v. Barry, 264 U.S. App. 
D.C. 1, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding no manifest imbalance by comparing the percentage of 
blacks in the employer’s relevant department with the percentage of blacks in the area labor 
force); Janowiak v. Corp. City of South Bend, 836 F.2d 1034, 1039 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding no 
manifest imbalance established where employer did not proffer any evidence of past 
discrimination nor a statistical comparison “between the relevant qualified area labor pool and 
17 
 Although the majority of cases in the Third Circuit require an internal imbalance,53 the 
Third Circuit’s analysis in Schurr v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc.54 implies that the required 
manifest imbalance may exist within the employer’s workforce, the general industry, or the job 
category.  In Schurr, the defendant was Resorts, a casino licensee in Atlantic City, New Jersey.55 
As a casino licensee, defendant was regulated by the state’s Casino Control Commission  
pursuant to the Casino Control Act.56 The Casino Control Act required casino licensees to 
improve the representation of “women and minorities in  . . . EEOC job categories in which the 
casino licensee is below the applicable employment goals” set by the Commission.57 In addition, 
casino licensees were required to develop an Equal Employment and Business Opportunity Plan 
to meet applicable employment goals set by the Commission and as a prerequisite to obtaining a 
 
the employer’s workforce”); Stock v. Universal Foods Corp., 817 F. Supp. 1300, 1306-07 (D. 
Md. 1993) (racial imbalance in the workforce tends to establish that the affirmative action plan is 
substantially related to a remedial purpose); Bertoncini v. City of Providence, 767 F. Supp. 1194, 
1202 (D. R.I. 1991) (“In deciding whether the kind of imbalance that exists justifies taking race 
or gender into account, . . . ‘a comparison of the percentage of minorities or women in the 
employer’s work force with the percentage in the area labor market or general population is 
appropriate.’”). 
 53 See e.g., Jaworski v. Cheney, 771 F. Supp. 109, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (referring to a 
manifest imbalance as a comparison between the employer’s jobs and the labor market). 
 54 Schurr v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 55 Id. at 490. 
 56 Id. at 488. 
 57 Id. at 489. 
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casino license.58 The Commission stated that the purpose underlying the Casino Control Act and 
similar regulations was “to ensure that the job creation which would accompany casino 
developments would benefit all segments of the population” in Atlantic City, which had a large 
minority population.59 
Karl Schurr, a white male, sought a position as a light and sound technician at Resorts.60 
Resorts’ Director of Show Operations and Stage Manager (“Director”) narrowed those under 
consideration to Schurr and Ronald Boykin, a black male.61 The Director viewed the two as 
equally qualified but believed he was generally obligated to hire the minority applicant if there 
were two equally qualified applicants for a job category in which the percentage of minorities 
was less than the goal established by the Commission regulations, as the technician job category 
was.62 As a result, the Director hired Boykin.63 
Schurr claimed that the Chairman of the Commission violated the Equal Protection 
Clause by enforcing the Commission’s regulations establishing minority employment goals 
against Schurr.64 This claim was rejected for Schurr’s lack of standing.65 Schurr also filed suit 
against Resorts for violating his rights under Title VII.66 
58 Id. 
59 Schurr v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 498 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 60 Id. at 490. 
 61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 488. 
 64 Schurr v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 490 (3d Cir. 1999).
65 Id. at 496. 
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 The Third Circuit held that the affirmative action plan was invalid because it was not 
designed to correct a manifest imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.67 In reaching 
this holding, the Third Circuit noted the justification behind both the plan and the regulations 
mandating the plan:  
The plan itself and the regulations which mandate the plan were 
not based on any finding of historical or then-current 
discrimination in the casino industry or in the technician job 
category; the plan was not put in place as a result of any manifest 
imbalance or in response to a finding that any relevant job category 
was or ever had been affected by segregation.68 
The Third Circuit concluded that the “absence of any reference to or showing of past or present 
discrimination in the casino industry [was] fatal [to the validity of the affirmative action plan].”69 
The court’s reasoning suggests that even if there had been no discrimination within the Resorts’ 
technician jobs, a manifest imbalance may have existed if there had been discrimination in the 
casino industry or in the technician job category generally.   
 In Frost v. Chrysler Motor Corporation,70 a Tenth Circuit district court explicitly 
provided that an employer “may justify the adoption of an affirmative action plan without 
showing a conspicuous imbalance among its own employees.”71 Chrysler had “adopted a 
Marketing Investment [P]rogram [(“MIP”)] to enable it to place dealerships in those areas in 
 
66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 497. 
 68 Id. at 497-98. 
 69 See id. at 498.
70 826 F. Supp. 1290 (W.D. Okla. 1993). 
 71 Id. at 1296. 
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which it ha[d] found no private investors with sufficient capital to open a dealership.”72 Mary 
Frost, a white female, applied for the Edmond Dodge dealership that was part of MIP but was 
rejected at a time when she was the only qualified applicant.73 The dealership was managed by 
an interim manager until a black male was selected as the dealer six months later.74 Frost filed 
suit against Chrysler, claiming racial discrimination under § 1981.75 Chrysler contended that it 
rejected Frost’s application for the Edmond Doge dealership pursuant to its affirmative action 
policy but failed to produce evidence showing that a racial imbalance existed with respect to 
people qualified for MIP.76 Consequently, the court held that Chrysler’s affirmative action plan 
was invalid: 
 While it is true that [an employer] may justify the adoption of an  
 affirmative action plan without showing a conspicuous imbalance  
 among its own employees, [the employer] must show a     
 conspicuous imbalance in the particular job category.  In this case,  
 Chrysler is attempting to remedy a conspicuous imbalance in one  
 job category (privately capitalized dealership owners) by    
 implementing an affirmative action plan in another (MIP    
 dealers).”77 
72 Id. at 1291. 
 73 Id. at 1292, 1294. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 1294. 
 76 Frost v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1290, 1296 (W.D. Okla. 1993). 
 77 Id. at 1296-97 (citations omitted). 
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II.  USING EXTERNAL IMBALANCES TO JUSTIFY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PRIVATE 
SCHOOLS  
A.  The Supreme Court’s Position 
 
The Third and Tenth Circuits’ receptiveness to justifying private-employer affirmative 
action with external imbalances supports justifying private-school affirmative action with 
external imbalances.  A more fundamental inquiry, however, is whether the Supreme Court has 
definitively spoken on the issue of external imbalances in private affirmative action, regardless 
of its context.78 In this subpart, I argue that the Supreme Court has not definitively resolved this 
issue, even in the private employment context, because the presence of internal imbalances in 
both Weber and Johnson rendered any such discussion unnecessary.  I further argue that, when 
viewed in light of Equal Protection caselaw, the Supreme Court dicta in Johnson weigh in favor 
of using external racial imbalances to justify affirmative action by private actors, including K-12 
private schools. 
 1. No Definitive Resolution by the Supreme Court 
The only time that the Supreme Court has even spoken on how § 1981 applies to a 
private nonsectarian school is in Runyon v. McCray. 79 However, Runyon provides little 
guidance to the issue at hand because it did not address how § 1981 applies to affirmative action 
but addressed how § 1981 applies to traditional racial discrimination. 
78 See United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 529-30 (1998) (determining 
initially that a basic question of interpretation had not been definitively resolved by the Supreme 
Court). 
 79 427 U.S. 160, 163-64 (1976). 
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 First and foremost, the Supreme Court has left open the possibility of justifying private 
affirmative action with external imbalances by having discussed only internal-imbalance 
justifications for private affirmative action.  The particular plans approved in Johnson and Weber 
were each justified by an internal imbalance.  In Weber, the defendant’s relevant plant had a 
skilled craftworker population that was 1.83% black and a local labor force that was 39% 
black.80 In Johnson, “none of the 238 Skilled Craftworker positions was held by a woman.”81 
The Weber majority’s understanding of “racial imbalance” as “racial imbalance in the 
employer’s work force” further indicates that it only spoke to the validity of internal-imbalance 
justifications for private affirmative action.82 The Johnson majority, likewise, used the phrase 
“racial imbalance” to mean “racial imbalance in the employer’s work force.”  
 
80 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198-99 (1979).   
 81 Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 621 (1987). 
 82 The Weber majority used the phrase “racial imbalance” or a variation of it in essentially 
one of three ways: 1) alone, 2) within the larger phrase of “racial imbalance in the employer’s 
work force,” and 3) within its standard of “conspicuous racial imbalances in traditionally 
segregated job categories.”   
 The first time that the Weber majority uses the phrase “racial imbalance” alone is after 
stating that § 703(j) of Title VII “provides that nothing contained in Title VII ‘shall be 
interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment . . . to any group because 
of the race . . . of such . . . group on account of’ a de facto racial imbalance in the employer’s 
work force.”  United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 205-06 (1979).  In support of its 
inference “that Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action,” the 
Weber majority then reasoned that § 703(j) of Title VII “does not state that ‘nothing in Title VII 
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shall be interpreted to permit’ voluntary affirmative efforts to correct racial imbalances.”  Id. at 
206.  By contrasting its hypothetical phrasing of § 703(j) of Title VII with the actual phrasing, 
and by only emphasizing the words “require” and “permit” in the actual and hypothetical 
phrasing, respectively, the Weber majority signals that the only meaningful difference between 
its hypothetical phrasing and the actual phrasing the difference between the meanings of 
“require” and “permit.”  However, that was not the only difference between the Weber majority’s 
hypothetical phrasing and the actual phrasing of § 703(j) of Title VII.  The Weber majority also 
used the phrase “racial imbalances” in its hypothetical provision instead of the phrase “racial 
imbalance in the employer’s work force” from the actual provision.  The Court’s failure to 
highlight this distinction suggests that the Weber majority understands “racial imbalances” to 
mean “racial imbalances in the employer’s work force.”   
 The Weber majority again uses “racial imbalance” and “racial imbalance in the 
employer’s work force” interchangeably in footnote 5, which states: “Section 703(j) speaks to 
substantive liability under Title VII, but it does not preclude courts from considering racial 
imbalance as evidence of a Title VII violation.  See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 
339-340, n. 20 (1977).”  Id. at 206 n.5.  Determining what the Weber majority meant this time by 
“racial imbalance” can be achieved by inspecting footnote 20 of Teamsters v. United States.
Footnote 20 reasons that statistics “comparing the racial composition of an employer's work 
force to the composition of the population at large” should be considered as evidence of a Title 
VII violation.  Thus, the Weber majority apparently also equated racial imbalance with an 
internal imbalance: the imbalance in the employer’s work force as compared to the general 
population.   
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 Third, the Weber Court desired to leave itself room to fill in the details of its affirmative 
action rule: “We need not today define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and 
impermissible affirmative action plans.  It suffices to hold that the challenged  . . . affirmative 
 
In demonstrating that Kaiser’s plan “does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the 
white employees,” the Weber majority observes that Kaiser’s plan “is not intended to maintain 
racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance.”  United Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).  To clarify this statement, the Weber majority explains that 
“[p]referential selection of craft trainees at the Gramercy plant will end as soon as the percentage 
of black skilled craftworkers in the Gramercy plant approximates the percentage of blacks in the 
local labor force.”  Id. at 208-09.  It is clear that by “manifest racial imbalance” the Weber 
majority again meant the internal imbalance of the employer’s work force in comparison to the 
general population. 
 Lastly, the Weber majority uses “racial imbalance” alone in quoting from the 
Congressional Record of Title VII.  Id. at 206.  Given that this is a quote from the Congressional 
Record of Title VII, the meaning of “racial imbalance” here is presumably the same as its 
meaning in Title VII, which, by its text, refers to an internal imbalance.   
 Thus, in designating manifest or conspicuous “racial imbalances in traditionally 
segregated job categories” as proper justifications for affirmative action policies, the Weber 
majority signaled approval only for racial imbalances that are both in traditionally segregated job 
categories and in the employer’s workforce and not for racial imbalances in traditionally 
segregated job categories regardless of whether this imbalance exists in the employer’s 
workforce.   
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action plan falls on the permissible side of the line.”83 The Weber majority and concurrence 
even both emphasized that the plan in Weber does not represent the outer bound of what 
affirmative action plans can do.84 
One of the Court’s reasons for upholding the Weber affirmative action policy further 
buttresses the assertion that it has left open the possibility of justifying private affirmative action 
with external imbalances.  In Weber, the Court upheld the affirmative action policy in dispute 
partially because its purposes mirror those of Title VII, which are “[breaking] down old patterns 
of racial segregation and hierarchy” and “[opening] employment opportunities for minorities 
which have been traditionally closed to them.”85 The purpose of justifying affirmative action 
with external imbalances also mirror those of Title VII.  If the Court validates particular 
affirmative action policies partially for this reason, then the Court should likewise validate 
particular types of affirmative action partially for the same reason. 
 In both Weber and Johnson, the Court had approved of the temporary nature of the 
subject affirmative action plans: the plans were not meant to maintain racial balances but simply 
to eliminate racial imbalances.86 This characteristic would not necessarily be lacking in a plan 
 
83 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. 
 84 The concurrence stated that “the Court’s opinion does not foreclose other forms of 
affirmative action.”  Id. at 215. 
 85 Id. at 208-09.  The Johnson majority, however, decreased the precedential weight of this 
reasoning by the Weber court by equating Title VII’s purpose to finding “a manifest imbalance 
in traditionally segregated job categories.”  Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631 
(1987). 
 86 See Weber, 443 U.S. at 209; Johnson, 480 U.S. at 639. 
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justified by an external imbalance.  In the private employment context, an affirmative action plan 
that is justified by an external imbalance should not logically end when the percentage of the 
target racial group in the employer’s labor force approximates that in the local labor force.  
However, the plan should end when the external imbalance is not manifest.  From this 
perspective, an external-imbalance justification is not intended to maintain racial balance but 
simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance.87 
2.  Supreme Court Dicta in Johnson Weighed Against Equal Protection    
 Caselaw  
 
Although the Supreme Court has not resolved the issue of using external imbalances to 
justify affirmative action in private entities, the Supreme Court dicta in Johnson weigh in favor 
of such justifications when viewed in light of Equal Protection caselaw.     
 Unlike the majority in Johnson, Justices Stevens and O’Connor comment on the scope of 
approved affirmative-action justifications in their concurrences, and in fact, take opposing 
stances on the very issue.  Justice Stevens’ concurrence opened the door for external imbalances.  
Like the Court in Weber, he “emphasize[d] that the [Johnson] opinion does not establish the 
permissible outer limits of voluntary programs undertaken by employers to benefit 
 
87 Given the Native Hawaiian focus of this Comment, it is of interest to understand how the 
Ninth Circuit developed its Weber rule.  The face of the Ninth Circuit’s rule clearly indicates that 
the imbalance justifying an affirmative action plan must be internal to the employer.  See infra 
Appendix.  In adopting this rule, however, the Ninth Circuit has not clearly faced the question of 
whether or not external imbalances may justify an affirmative action plan.   
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disadvantaged groups.”88 Justice Stevens even went so far as to suggest other possible 
justifications for affirmative action plans:  
Instead of retroactively scrutinizing his own or society’s possible 
exclusions of minorities in the past to determine the outer limits of 
a valid affirmative-action program . . . in many cases the employer 
will find it more appropriate to consider other legitimate reasons to 
give preferences to members of underrepresented groups.  Statutes 
enacted for the benefit of minority groups should not block these 
forward-looking considerations.89 
Most notably, Justice Stevens suggested that employers might advance the forward-looking 
reason of “improving their services to black constituencies” or “averting racial tension over the 
allocation of jobs in a community’” to justify their affirmative action plans.90 These 
justifications are not internal to the employer because they logically can continue justifying an 
employer’s affirmative action plan even after the percentage of the target racial group in the 
employer’s workforce approximates that in the local workforce.91 
88 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 642. 
 89 Id. at 646. 
 90 Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647 (1987). 
 91 As mentioned earlier, this Comment defines internal-imbalance justifications as those 
that logically cease justifying an affirmative action policy once the percentage of the preferred 
race in the private entity approximates that in the local area.  Under this definition, past 
discrimination towards blacks or a manifest lack of Asian Americans would be internal-
imbalance justifications because the private entity has arguably made up for the past 
discrimination towards blacks or the manifest lack of Asian Americans once the percentage of 
the preferred race in the entity’s population approximates that in the local area.  On the other 
hand, the justifications of diversity and improving services to black constituencies are external-
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 Justice O’Connor’s concurrence directly opposed Justice Stevens’ concurrence: 
“Contrary to the intimations in Justice Stevens’ concurrence, this Court does not approve 
preferences for minorities ‘for any reason that might seem sensible from a business or a social 
point of view.’”92 O’Connor pointed out that in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,93 the 
Court had concluded societal discrimination without more was too amorphous a basis for 
imposing a racially classified remedy:  “Instead, we determined that affirmative action was valid 
if it was crafted to remedy past or present discrimination by the employer.”94 In fact, “because 
both Wygant and Weber attempt[ed] to reconcile the same competing concerns,” O’Connor saw 
little justification to adopt different standards for affirmative action under Title VII and the Equal 
Protection Clause.95 
Viewed in isolation, it is difficult to determine whether these concurrences together 
weigh in favor of or against permitting external imbalances to justify affirmative action in private 
schools.  Aside from the concurrences opposing each other on the scope of proper affirmative-
action justifications, they were both singular and unnecessary to uphold the Court’s majority 
opinion.  The Court also has not squarely confronted a private affirmative action case under 
 
imbalance justifications because the private entity may continue to reap the benefits of diversity 
and improving services to black constituencies, which result from its affirmative action policy, 
even when the percentage of the preferred race in the private entity’s population approximates 
that in the local area.   
 92 Id. at 649. 
 93 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
 94 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 650. 
 95 Id. at 652. 
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either Title VII or § 1981 since Johnson. Given this dearth of Supreme Court guidance in private 
affirmative action, it is helpful to view the concurrences of Justice Stevens and O’Connor in light 
of topical, jurisprudential developments in the Equal Protection Clause, § 1981’s governmental 
counterpart. 
 These concurrences together weigh in favor of permitting external imbalances to justify 
affirmative action in private schools because the Court has not adopted O’Connor’s position that 
affirmative action by private and government actors should be subject to the same standard.  In 
addition, courts have approved of a wider variety of affirmative-action justifications for 
government actors. 
 The Court not adopting the same standard for affirmative action by both private and 
government actors lessens the significance of O’Connor’s observation in Wygant v. Jackson 
Board of Education that the Court previously had asserted only past or present discrimination by 
the employer could justify affirmative action but societal discrimination could not.96 
Although some of Justice Stevens’ views in Johnson either have not been confirmed97 or 
have not been embraced,98 his suggestion of using forward-looking reasons as justifications for 
 
96 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
 97 Justice Stevens’ position that Johnson does not establish the outer limits of affirmative 
action plans by private employers has not been confirmed because the Court has not heard any 
private affirmative action case under either Title VII or § 1981 since Johnson.
98 Justice Stevens’ suggestion of using forward-looking justifications for affirmative action 
policies has not been embraced by the lower courts.  His suggestion was not discussed in Schurr 
or Frost, the cases discussed in Part I.B. that appeared to accept external imbalances as 
legitimate justifications of affirmative action in private employers.  Justice Stevens’ suggestion 
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affirmative action policies has grown firm roots in the Equal Protection context.  For example, in 
the companion cases of Grutter v. Bollinger99 and Gratz v. Bollinger,100 the Supreme Court used 
diversity to justify affirmative action in public higher education.  In Reynolds v. City of 
Chicago,101 the Seventh Circuit accepted compelling public safety concerns as legitimate 
justifications for affirmative action in law enforcement.  Further, in Hunter v. Regents of the 
University of California,102 the Ninth Circuit held that improving the quality of education in 
urban public schools justified affirmative action in a public, research-oriented elementary 
school.103 
was even rejected by the Third Circuit in Taxman v. Board of Education, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 
1995), a case that was decided prior to Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  The Third 
Circuit in Taxman determined that an employer could not use race as a factor in selecting which 
of two equally qualified employees to lay off because racial diversity did not properly justify 
affirmative action under Title VII.   
 99 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 100 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 101 1 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 102 190 F.3d 1061 (1999). 
 103 Similarly, O’Connor’s position that the Court does not approve minority preferences for 
any sensible business or social perspective but only for remedying past or present discrimination 
is true insofar as most Circuits require a manifest internal imbalance to justify an affirmative 
action plan under § 1981.  (A manifest imbalance may be thought of as non-incriminating 
evidence of past discrimination.)  In turn, this position has not held true in the Equal Protection 
context, as evidenced by the array of proper affirmative-action justifications noted earlier.   
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 The Court’s decision to treat affirmative action by private and government actors 
differently also supports the assertion, made by many courts, that a private actor has more 
leeway to use affirmative action than a government actor.104 Giving private actors greater ability 
to use affirmative action strongly implies that private actors should be able to justify their 
affirmative action policies with reasons at least as broad as those used in the Equal Protection 
context.  Thus, private actors should be able to justify their affirmative action policies with 
reasons even broader than diversity, public safety, and improving the quality of public education.  
In light of these Equal Protection Clause developments, the concurrences in Johnson weigh in 
favor of permitting private schools to justify their affirmative action policies with external racial 
imbalances.   
 
104 See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (“In the area of affirmative 
action, Title VII apparently is viewed as somewhat less restrictive than the Equal Protection 
Clause at least insofar as voluntary affirmative action plans are concerned.”); Stuart v. Roache, 
951 F.2d 446 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that plaintiff’s § 1981 claim must fail where the remedial 
plan passed strict scrutiny); Kromnick v. Sch. Dist., 739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984) (“The scope of 
Title VII is broader than that of the Constitution.”); Shuford v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 846 F. 
Supp. 1511 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (“Because strict scrutiny is the ‘more restrictive’ standard and 
because the court concludes that the proposed decree passes strict-scrutiny analysis, the court 
need not analyze the decree separately under the standard of Title VII.”); cf. Taxman v. Bd. of 
Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (“While the Supreme Court may indeed at some future date 
hold that an affirmative action purpose that satisfies the Constitution must necessarily satisfy 
Title VII, it has yet to do so.”). 
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B.  Policy in Support of Using External Imbalances to Justify Affirmative Action in K- 
 12 Private Schools      
 
Although policy considerations do not support using external imbalances to justify 
affirmative action at all private schools, they do weigh in favor of such a use at K-12 private 
schools, including the Kamehameha Schools. 
1.  Most Effective Allocation of Incentives and Means to Remedy Social    
 Disparities       
 
The consequence of allowing private schools to justify their affirmative action policies 
only with manifest imbalances in their own student populations is the curtailment of 
contributions that private schools desire to make toward remedying racial disparities.     
 To illustrate, consider six hypothetical private schools that are located in an area where 
the academically underachieving racial group constitutes 30 percent of the population.  All six 
schools have been in existence for 20 years, but each has had a different admission policy, as 
provided in the table below.  The result of the schools having had different admission policies is 
that the schools have correspondingly different student-body compositions. 
School Mission Admissions Policy 
Percentage of 
Students That 





Are Not of the 
Target Racial 
Group 
A No relevant mission 
 
Discrimination 
against the target 
racial group until 






B No relevant mission 
 
Discrimination 
against the target 
racial group until 







C No relevant mission 
 
Strictly academic 4% 96% 
D No relevant mission 
 
Academic with 




E Mission of helping 





preference for target 
racial group 
85% 15% 
F Mission of helping 









Schools A, B, and C have engaged in “traditional” discrimination, have admissions 
criteria with traditionally discriminatory effects, or both.  Schools A, B, and C consequently have 
far smaller percentages of the target racial group in their student bodies than the percentage in 
the surrounding population.  In other words, schools A, B, and C have manifest imbalances in 
their student bodies that could justify the use of admissions preferences for the targeted racial 
group under the imported Weber rule.  However, given that none of these three schools has the 
mission of helping the target racial group, these schools would likely use a racial preference only 
to the extent that they believe such a use would help them for other reasons, like enriching their 
students’ educational experience, increasing their revenue, or increasing their prestige.   
 The percentage of the target racial group in school D is comparable to that in the 
surrounding population because school D has used a racial admissions preference to increase 
diversity in its student population.  The percentage of the target racial group in school E is 
actually significantly greater than that in the surrounding population because school E has used 
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its racial admissions preference to better achieve its mission of helping the target racial group’s 
academic achievement.  Under the imported Weber rule, schools D and E would have to stop 
using their racial preference because manifest imbalances do not exist in their student bodies.  
Since these two schools would no longer be able to use a racial admissions preference, the 
percentage of the target racial group in each of their student bodies likely would decrease.  If 
school D’s academic admissions criteria are as strict as those of school C, the percentage of the 
target racial group in school D’s population could decrease as much as 18 percent, from its 
current 22 percent to four percent – the percentage of the target racial group in school C’s 
population.   
 Since the mission of school E is to help the target racial group’s academic achievement, 
school E likely would attempt to maintain the percentage of the target racial group in its 
population, even without the use of its racial admissions preference.  School E may try using an 
alternative admissions preference, like a low income-level admissions preference, as a proxy for 
its invalidated racial admissions preference.  Even so, the percentage of the target racial group in 
school E’s population likely would decrease because the alternative admissions preference likely 
would be an imperfect proxy for race.  If this were not true and school E was a rational actor, 
school E should have no problem using the alternative admissions preference in place of its 
invalid racial admissions preference.   
 School F illustrates circumstances in which a school with the mission of helping the 
target racial group’s academic achievement may have a chance of being able to continue using 
its racial admissions preference under the imported Weber rule.  However, school F also 
illustrates how unlikely it is that such a school exists: a rational school with the mission of 
helping the target racial group’s academic achievement and with the ability to use a racial 
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admissions preference would have a much higher percentage of the target racial group in its 
student body than school F does.   
 These six hypothetical schools show how, under the imported Weber rule, private schools 
with the greatest incentive to remedy a racial disparity are not able to use a racial admissions 
preference to maximize their contributions to remedying the disparity.105 The failure to allocate 
the most effective means of remedying a racial disparity to those with the greatest motivation to 
do so that results from the imported Weber rule reflects the Weber rule’s origination in cases 
where the defendant private employers were like schools A, B, and C: they had engaged in 
“traditional” discrimination, had a hiring process with traditionally discriminatory effects, or 
both.   As explained earlier, the Court simply was not faced with a private entity that existed for 
the purpose of remedying a racial disparity when it decided either Weber or Johnson.
Consequently, the rule resulting from these two cases does not sensibly deal with affirmative 
action in private entities existing for the purpose of remedying a racial disparity. 
 If, in addition to internal imbalances, private schools are permitted to justify their 
affirmative action policies with external imbalances, the results described above would change 
only in that schools D and E would be able to continue using their racial admissions preferences.  
In effect, school E would be permitted to most effectively achieve its mission of helping the 
target racial group’s academic underachievement by admitting primarily or exclusively students 
of that racial group.   
 
105 Despite the Third Circuit’s pre-Grutter decision in Taxman, it is very likely that school D 
would be able to continue using its racial preference on the basis of diversity given the Supreme 
Court’s approval of diversity as a justification for affirmative action in public higher education 
under the Equal Protection Clause.   
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2.  Basis for Treating Private K-12 Schools Differently Than Other Private   
 Entities Under § 1981 
 
In this subpart, I argue that K-12 private schools should be treated differently than other 
private actors under § 1981 by having the ability to use external imbalances as proper 
justifications for their affirmative action policies because society benefits from more affirmative 
action in K-12 private schools.  Not only does such affirmative action result in more benefits 
than burdens, its benefits and burdens also compare favorably to the benefits and burdens of 
currently permitted forms of affirmative action. 
 To reach these conclusions, I assume that giving K-12 private schools the ability to use 
external imbalances as proper justifications will increase the availability of K-12 private 
education for academically underachieving racial groups, and I assume that K-12 private schools 
are of good quality.   
 a. Comparing the Benefits and Burdens of Affirmative Action in K-12 Private  
 Schools       
 
If one thinks in terms of the familiar foot-race metaphor, it was not 
enough to say:  “From now on, everyone may compete on equal 
terms, and may the race go to the swiftest.”  If, as a result of 
centuries of illegal discrimination, one large class of contestants is 
fifty yards behind the other contestants’ starting line when the gun 
is fired, the race cannot be considered fair merely because from 
now on no further special handicaps are imposed.  Equality has not 
been achieved until something has been done to bring the 
disadvantaged contestants up to the starting line.  In short, it is not 
enough for those who have discriminated illegally to stop what 
they are doing – they must also undo the effects of their past 
discrimination.106 
106 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 62.01 (2005), available at LEXIS, 3-62 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 62.02. 
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 That some types of affirmative action policies have been sanctioned essentially represents 
a policy judgment that, in some cases, the benefit to society of bringing “the disadvantaged 
contestants up to the starting line” outweighs the burden to society of “trammeling” the 
“majority” racial group or gender.107 I contend that the benefits of affirmative action in 
Kamehameha Schools and other private K-12 schools outweigh its burdens. 
 The primary benefit of permitting K-12 private schools to justify their affirmative action 
policies with external imbalances is to increase or to encourage increased availability of good K-
12 education for academically underachieving racial groups.  In turn, so long as children of 
academically underachieving racial groups can take advantage of any increased availability108 of 
good K-12 education,109 more of these children will have obtained a good K-12 education than 
would otherwise have been able to. The quality of a person’s K-12 education significantly 
 
107 See Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1195, 1269 (2002) (“[T]he divisive effects of undoing injustice must be weighed 
against the divisive effects of leaving it intact.”). 
 108 When there exists schools with the mission of remedying a racial disparity, like the 
Kamehameha Schools, increased availability rather than an encouraged increase of availability 
would result from permitting K-12 private schools to justify their affirmative action policies with 
external imbalances.  
 109 At least with the Kamehameha Schools, Native Hawaiians’ ability to afford attending the 
Schools is not a significant issue.  Backed by “one of the world’s wealthiest charities,” the 
“Schools subsidize much of the educational costs [of their students] through funds held in trust.”  
See Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 416 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2005).   
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influences her ability to undertake and succeed in higher education:110 even by as early as the end 
of third grade, “[b]oth U.S. . . . and cross-national data . . . suggest that, children are launched 
into achievement trajectories that they follow the rest of their school years.”111 With increased 
educational attainment, the beneficiaries of affirmative action in K-12 private schools likely will 
have greater earnings,112 a healthier life,113 and a longer life114 than they would have had if only 
internal imbalances legitimately justified affirmative action in K-12 private schools.  
 
110 Laura W. Perna, The Key to College Access: Rigorous Academic Preparation, in 
PREPARING FOR COLLEGE: NINE ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE OUTREACH 113, 131 (William G. 
Tierney, et al. eds., 2005) (“[T]he process of becoming academically qualified to enroll in 
college begins as early as eighth grade,” and “[r]esearch shows the benefits of promoting high-
quality academic preparation prior to the high school years” in preparing for college.); Goodwin 
Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 HOW. L.J. 705, 706 (2004) ([T]he path to leadership 
begins . . . in high-quality elementary and secondary schools that are too rarely found in 
communities where minority students live.”); see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1981) (Both 
the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its 
deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction [of education from other forms of social 
welfare legislation].”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Compulsory school 
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society.”). 
 111 KARL L. ALEXANDER & DORIS R. ENTWISLE, ACHIEVEMENT IN THE FIRST 2 YEARS OF 
SCHOOL: PATTERNS AND PROCESSES 1 (1988). 
 112 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 
STATISTICAL BRIEF: MORE EDUCATION MEANS HIGHER CAREER EARNINGS 1 (1994), available at 
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 The burdens of using external imbalances to justify affirmative action in private schools 
are minimal.  As discussed earlier, the significant consequence of allowing external-imbalance 
justifications, in addition to internal-imbalance justifications, is that private schools with the 
mission of remedying a racial disparity can continue using their racial preferences to achieve 
their mission.  Whether the racial preferences result in exclusive or primary admission of the 
preferred racial group, the burden on the non-preferred racial group remains having either little 
or no chance of attending private schools with the mission of remedying a racial disparity.  
Denial of admissions would unsettle no legitimate, firmly rooted expectation on the part of the 
applicant of attending that private school.115 In addition, the applicant would still be virtually 
guaranteed admittance to a K-12 school, as provided by the government.116 
http://www.census.gov/apsd/www/statbrief/sb94_17.pdf (“[M]ore education means greater 
earnings over a year’s time.”). 
 113 See Eileen M. Crimmins & Yasuhiko Saito, Trends in Healthy Life Expectancy in the 
United States,1970–1990: Gender, Racial ,and Educational Differences, 52 Social Science & 
Medicine 1629, 1636 (2001) (providing data that demonstrates a positive correlation between 
years of school completed with both total life expectancy and healthy life expectancy for whites 
and blacks of both genders). 
 114 Id. 
115 See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987). 
 116 See Pherabe Kolb, Comment: Reaching for the Silver Lining: Constructing a 
Nonremedial yet “Exceedingly Persuasive” Rationale for Single-Sex Educational Programs in 
Public Schools, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 367, 378-81 (2001) (“[T]he laws governing colleges and 
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 Although classifying people solely on the basis of race may “threaten to stigmatize 
individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group,” threaten “to incite racial hostility,” 
and exacerbate the very conditions that the policy is intended to counteract, racial classifications 
are nonetheless currently permitted, albeit only in certain circumstances.117 Thus, as noted 
earlier, that racial classifications are permitted in certain circumstances reflects a judgment that, 
in those circumstances, the benefits to society of the racial classification outweighs its burdens, 
including the potential stigma, hostility, and exacerbation that may result.  Furthermore, 
“rejecting an affirmative action policy for fear of racial stigmatization and hostility implies a 
judgment that existing types of stigmatization and hostility in society are more tolerable.” 118 
Academically underachieving racial groups “could argue that they are already stigmatized by the  
. . . group’s high rate of poverty and unemployment and low level of educational and 
professional attainment.”119 
In sum, the benefit of smaller racial disparities in education, income, quality and length 
of life that results from increasing the ability of academically underachieving racial groups to 
obtain good K-12 education outweighs the burden of the non-preferred race’s unchanged 
expectations as to their chances of admittance to private schools with the mission of remedying 
racial disparities and the burden of continuing racial stigma and hostility, which may be of a 
different nature but not necessarily of a different strength than would otherwise be present. 
 
universities should not be applied without amendment to the elementary or secondary school 
context.”). 
 117 Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 416 F.3d 1025, 1042. 




 b.  Comparing Affirmative Action in K-12 Private Schools to Currently-   
 Permitted Forms of Affirmative Action 
 
I contend that society enjoys greater benefits from having more affirmative action in K-
12 private schools and correspondingly less affirmative action in higher education and 
employment because affirmative action in K-12 private schools results in relatively greater 
benefits and lesser burdens.  This rests on the assumption that there will not be an increase in the 
total quantity of affirmative action as a result of permitting external balances to justify 
affirmative action in K-12 private schools.  In other words, any increased amount of affirmative 
action in private K-12 schools will be offset by an equal or greater decrease of affirmative action 
in employment and higher education.   
 The benefits of affirmative action in K-12 private schools are greater than affirmative 
action in higher education and employment because the advantage conferred by affirmative 
action in K-12 private schools, by definition, occurs earlier in a person’s life.  Thus, beneficiaries 
of affirmative action in K-12 private schools have a longer period in which to reap the benefits of 
the conferred advantage.  In addition, whereas affirmative action in higher education and 
employment arguably gives the beneficiary the advantage of slightly lowered admittance or 
hiring standards, affirmative action in K-12 private schools gives the beneficiary the advantage 
of fundamental skills and knowledge.      
 Affirmative action in private K-12 schools is less burdensome than affirmative action in 
higher education and employment because the government has undertaken the responsibility to 
educate children in grades K-12.120 Whereas, there may not be another university, graduate 
 
120 See Kolb, supra note 111, at 378-381 (“[S]tates are required to provide an intangible 
amount of education to all public school children.”); cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1981) 
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school, or workplace to which a person burdened by a currently permitted affirmative action 
policy may turn, the government virtually guarantees a school for which children burdened by a 
private school’s affirmative action policy may attend.121 
Lastly, because the advantage conferred by affirmative action in K-12 private schools is 
not a “double standard” but fundamental skills and knowledge and because a child will always 
have a K-12 school that she can attend, people of the non-preferred race are likely to feel less 
trammeled by affirmative action in K-12 private schools than in higher education or 
employment.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
K-12 private schools, including the Kamehameha Schools, should be able to primarily 
admit students of an academically underperforming racial group because this is the most 
effective allocation of incentives and means for remedying racial disparities.  Such affirmative 
action better remedies racial disparities than presently-permitted forms of affirmative action 
because it confers greater benefits and lesser burdens on society.  As a consequence, society 
would benefit from encouraging affirmative action policies in K-12 private schools by giving 
these schools the ability to justify their policies with external imbalances.   
 
(“Public education is not a ‘right’ granted to individuals by the Constitution. But neither is it 
merely some governmental "benefit" indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare 
legislation.”) (citation omitted).  
 121 See Kolb, supra note 111, at 378-381 (“[T]he laws governing colleges and universities 
should not be applied without amendment to the elementary or secondary school context.”). 
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APPENDIX: SURVEY OF RULES GOVERNING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS  
Rule Plan’s Justifications Plan’s  Limitations 
First 
Circuit 
First, it must be a temporary 
measure, not designed to 
maintain racial balance but to 
eliminate a manifest racial 
imbalance.122 Second, it must 
not unnecessarily trammel the 
interests of the white 
employees nor create an 
absolute bar to the 
advancement of white 
employees.123 




 Being a 
temporary 
measure 
 Not maintaining 
racial balance 
 Being designed 
to achieve its 
goal 
 Not unnecessarily 
trammeling the 
interests of the 
white employees 
 Not creating an 







The court looks to whether 
there is a history of 
discrimination resulting in a 
workforce imbalance, whether 
the plan is temporary in nature, 
whether it is narrowly tailored 
to correct the imbalance, and 
 “[R]emedy[ing] a 
history of 
discrimination 
resulting in a 
workforce 
imbalance”125 
 Being temporary 
in nature 
 Being narrowly 
tailored to 
achieve its goal 
 Not unnecessarily 
trammeling the 
122 Bertoncini v. City of Providence, 767 F. Supp. 1194, 1201 (D.R.I. 1991).   
 123 Id.; cf. Petitti v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 816, at 
*13-14  (D. Mass. 1988) (“[T]he validity of such a plan turns on three issues: (1) whether the 
plan was ‘justified by a manifest imbalance that reflected under-representation of women in 
traditionally segregated job categories,’; (2) ‘whether the . . . [p]lan unnecessarily trammeled the 
rights of male employees or created an absolute bar to their advancement,’; and (3) whether the 
plan was intended to attain, rather than maintain, a balanced work force.”) (citations omitted). 
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the extent to which it affects 
the rights of third parties.124 




Title VII's prohibition against 
racial discrimination is not 
violated by affirmative action 
plans which, first, have 
purposes that mirror those of 
the statute and second, do not 
unnecessarily trammel the 
interests of the non-minority 
employees.127 
For an affirmative action plan 
to have purposes that mirror 
those of the statute, the 
purpose must be remedial, like 
remedying the segregation and 






in turn, is a 
remedial purpose 
that mirrors those 
of the statute   
 
 Being designed 
to achieve its 
goal 
 Not unnecessarily 
trammeling the 
interest of the 
non-minority 
employee  
124 Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 74 F. Supp. 2d 321, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999), aff’d 310 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Bushey v. N.Y. State Civil Serv. Comm’n, 733 
F.2d 220, 227-28 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1117  (permitting affirmative action plan 
under Title VII “when[] the job category in question is traditionally segregated” and when the 
plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the nonminority employees) (1985); cf. 
Honadle v. Univ. of Vt. & State Agric. Coll., 56 F. Supp. 2d 419, 425 (D. Va. 1999) (“[A]n 
employer could lawfully make race-conscious employment decisions to eliminate manifest racial 
imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories, as long as the plan does not unnecessarily 
trammel the interests of the white employees.”). 
 125 Patrolmen’s, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 338. 
 126 Bushey, 773 F.2d at 228. 
 127 Schurr v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 497 (3d Cir. 1999); Taxman v. Board of 
Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1554-55 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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underrepresentation of 
minorities that discrimination 
has caused in the nation’s 
workforce.128 However, for an 
affirmative action to be 
remedial, it must be designed 
to correct a manifest imbalance 







An employer's voluntary 
affirmative action plan is not a 
violation of Title VII if (1) its 
purpose is similar to that of 
Title VII, namely to "break 
down old patterns" of 
discrimination; (2) the plan 
does not "unnecessarily 
trammel" the rights of those 
outside the group that it is 
designed to protect; and (3) it 
is designed to eliminate a 
manifest racial or sexual 
imbalance.130 
 Breaking down 
old patterns of 
discrimination131 
 Eliminating a 
manifest racial or 
sexual imbalance  
 
 Not unnecessarily 
trammeling the 
rights of those 
outside the group 
that it is designed 
to protect 
 Being designed 
to eliminate a 
manifest racial or 
sexual imbalance 
 
128 Schurr, 196 F.3d at 497; Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1557. 
 129 Schurr, 196 F.3d at 497; Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1556. 
 130 Smith v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 676 (4th Cir. 1996); Messer v. Meno, 
936 F. Supp. 1280, 1293 (W.D. Texas 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 130 F.3d 130 (5th Cir. 
1997); cf. Lilly v. Beckley, 797 F.2d 191, 194 (4th Cir. 1986) (“[Test drawn from Weber] 
inquires whether the plan contains safeguards necessary to avoid trammelling the rights of non-
minorities, whether the plan is designed to remedy past discrimination, and whether the plan is 
temporary.”).  
 131 This is considered to be a purpose similar to that of Title VII in the Fifth Circuit.  See 




“Weber stands for the general 
proposition that voluntary 
affirmative action is proper if it 
is designed to eliminate 
reasonable under all of the 
circumstances.”132 A plan is 
reasonable if it is like the plan 
in Weber in that it: 1) is 
temporary; 2) is not intended to 
maintain racial balance but 
simply to eliminate a 
conspicuous racial imbalance 
in traditionally segregated job 
categories; and 3) does not 
"unnecessarily trammel" the 
interests of white employees 
because it does not cause any 
whites to be dismissed and 
does not absolutely bar whites 
from advancement.133 
 Reasonable goal 
under all the 
circumstances 








 Being temporary 
 Not maintaining 
a racial balance 
 Not unnecessarily 
trammeling the 
interests of white 
employees by 
causing whites to 








“An affirmative action plan is 
valid under Title VII if it (1) is 
adopted and designed to 
correct ‘manifest racial 
imbalances in traditionally 
segregated job categories,’ and 
(2) does not ‘unnecessarily 
trammel the interests of white 
employees.’”134 
The Seventh Circuit interprets 
a manifest racial imbalance in 
 Correcting a 
manifest racial 
disparity in some 




 Being designed 
to achieve its 
goal 
 Not unduly 
trammeling the 
interests of white 
employees 
132 Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930, 983 (E.D. Mich. 1979), aff’d sub nom. Bratton 
v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 133 Id. at 983, 986; cf. Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 689 (6th Cir. 
1979) (“The test under Title VII of voluntary affirmative action is whether the action is 
consistent with the anti-discrimination policy of the statute.”), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981). 
 134 McNamara v. City of Chicago, 867 F. Supp. 739, 749 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
47 
traditionally segregated job 
categories to mean a manifest 
racial disparity in some part of 
the employer’s workforce.135 
Eighth 
Circuit 
“The first burden on the 
employer in a reverse 
discrimination suit is to 
produce some evidence that its 
affirmative action program was 
a response to a conspicuous 
racial imbalance in its work 
force and is remedial.”136 “The 
second burden on the employer 
in a reverse discrimination suit 
 Responding to a 
conspicuous 
racial imbalance 
in its work force 
 Being remedial 
 Being reasonably 
related to such 
considerations as 
the racial 
imbalance of the 
 Being remedial 
 Being reasonably 




135 Id. at 752. 
 136 Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 968 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 
(1981); cf. Maitland v. Univ. of Minn., 155 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that an 
affirmative action hiring plan may not be successfully challenged as a violation of Title VII, if 
the consideration of an otherwise improper factor was justified by the existence of a manifest 
imbalance that reflected underrepresentation of the minority in traditionally segregated job 
categories, if the employment plan did not unnecessarily trammel the rights of male employees, 
and if the employment plan was intended to attain a balance, not to maintain one), cert. denied,
535 U.S. 929 (2002); Sisco v. J. S. Alberici Constr. Co., 655 F.2d 146, 149 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(“[A]n employer who in good faith applies an affirmative-action plan to remedy past 
discrimination is not in violation of either Title VII or Section 1981, so long as the plan lasts no 
longer than necessary ‘to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance,’ ‘does not unnecessarily 
trammel the interests of the white employees,’ ‘does not require the discharge of white workers 
and their replacement with new black hirees,’ and does not ‘create an absolute bar to the 
advancement of white employees.’”), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982). 
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is to produce some evidence 
that its affirmative action plan 
is reasonably related to the 
plan's remedial purpose.”137 











An affirmative action plan 
must: 1) respond to a manifest 
imbalance in its work force, 2) 
not create an absolute bar to 
the advancement of the non-
preferred race or unnecessarily 
trammel their rights, and 3) do 
no more than is necessary to 
achieve a balance.138 
 Responding to a 
manifest 
imbalance in its 
work force.   
 Not creating an 
absolute bar to 
the advancement 
of the non-
preferred race   
 Not unnecessarily 
trammeling their 
rights  
 Doing no more 
than is necessary 
to achieve a 
balance. 
137 Setser, 657 F.2d at 968-69. 
 138 Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 520-21 (9th Cir. 2002); Doe v. Kamehameha, 416
F.3d 1025, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005); cf. Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438, 
1448 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Where a finding of manifest imbalance justifies a consent decree's 
affirmative relief, the decree may be approved provided it does not ‘unnecessarily trammel the 
interests of the White employees’ or create an ‘absolute bar to the advancement of White 
employees.’”); Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 356-57  (9th Cir. 1987) (analyzing 
whether affirmative action plan complied with Title VII depended on whether consideration of 
the sex of applicants for skilled craft jobs was justified by the existence of a manifest imbalance 
that reflected underrepresentation of women in traditionally segregated job categories and 
whether the Agency Plan unnecessarily trammeled the rights of male employees or created an 









First, the plan must be justified 
by a conspicuous or manifest 
imbalance in traditionally 
segregated job categories; 139 
and second, the plan must not 
unnecessarily trammel the 
rights of the non-minority or 
create an absolute bar to their 
advancement.140 







must reflect the 
underrepresentati
on of women or 
minorities in the 
Eleventh Circuit 
 
 Not unnecessarily 
trammeling the 
rights of the 
nonminority  
 Not creating an 





Title VII will permit private-
sector voluntary affirmative 
action under the following 
circumstances, and perhaps 
others:  
 
The plan does not   
unnecessarily trammel the 
interests of the white 
employees. The plan does not 
require the discharge of white 
workers and their re-placement 
with new black hirees. Nor 
does the plan create an 
absolute bar to the 
advancement of white 
employees; half of those 
trained in the program will be 
white. Moreover, the plan is a 
temporary measure; it is not 
intended to maintain racial 
 Eliminating a 
manifest racial 
imbalance  
 Not unnecessarily 
trammeling the 
interests of the 
white employees 





new black hirees 
 Not creating an 




 Being a 
temporary 
measure 
 Not maintaining 
a racial balance  
139 The imbalance must reflect the underrepresentation of women or minorities in the 
Eleventh Circuit.  See In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 
1492, 1500 (11th Cir. 1987).   
 140 See id. at 1500; Frost v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1290, 1296 (W.D. Okl. 
1993); Cunico v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 917 F.2d 431, 437 (10th Cir. 1990). 
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balance but simply to eliminate 
a manifest racial imbalance.141 
141 Dougherty v. Barry, 607 F. Supp. 1271, 1286 (D.C. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 869
F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
